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IN RE NEWMAN: THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT DISMANTLES
AN OBSTACLE FOR PERPETUAL MOTION PATENT
APPLICANTS
In re Newman' marks an important milestone in a controversial area of
patent law - perpetual motion machines. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit granted the patent applicant's petition for a writ of
mandamus to compel the district court to vacate or modify its orders authoriz-
ing the dismantling and destruction of the applicant's machine.' The Court of
Appeals held that while the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) could conduct
additional tests to determine whether the machine satisfies the statutory re-
quirement of utility3 necessary for a patent, the PTO could not destroy the
machine to discover why it works.' The ruling by the Court of Appeals is a ma-
jor step for perpetual motion proponents seeking to gain a level playing field
with the PTO.
This note first gives a general background on perpetual motion, because a
basic understanding of the subject is helpful in getting a good perspective on
the case. Next, the note provides the factual setting of the case leading to the
court's decision. Then, the note examines the rationale the court used in
reaching its decision. Lastly, the note provides additional insight into the legal
problems posed by perpetual motion, both in general and in the Newman case
in particular.
GENERAL BACKGROUND
Before examining the Newman case in depth, it is useful to have a basic
working knowledge of various aspects of perpetual motion. Perpetual motion
has a long and colorful history.' For hundreds of years, man has attempted to
design a machine that would produce more energy than it would consume,6 yet
'782 F.2d 971 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
'Id. at 972.
335 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) provides the statutory requirement for utility:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of mat-
ter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
'Newman, 782 F.2d at 974.
'Two excellent articles have been written recently on the history of perpetual motion. For a well-balanced
treatment, see Gardner, Perpetual Motion: The Quest for Machines that Power Themselves, SCIENCE
DIGEST, October, 1985, at 68. Gardner discusses the theories behind perpetual motion machines and
analyzes numerous attempts at designing these devices. For a more cynical view, see Adler, The Perpetual
Search for Perpetual Motion, AMERICAN HERITAGE OF INVENTION AND TECHNOLOGY, Summer, 1986, at 58.
In this article, Adler describes many perpetual motion machines and exposes the "hidden cranks" that ran
them.
'An early, comprehensive discourse on perpetual motion machines may be found in J. WILKENS,
MATHEMATICAL MAGICK: OR, THE WONDERS THAT MAY BE PERFORMED BY MECHANICAL GEOMETRY
(1691), available through Xerox University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, Michigan. Wilkens was an early propo-
nent of perpetual motion and was probably the first person to design a perpetual motion device using the
magnetic forces in nature.
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no one has been able to build such a device because, according to conventional
science, perpetual motion of this kind is impossible.7 To understand why cur-
rent scientific thinking views perpetual motion as impossible, it is necessary to
delve into the elementary theories of perpetual motion.
There are three types of perpetual motion: perpetual motion of the first
kind, perpetual motion of the second kind, and perpetual motion of the third
kind.' Perpetual motion of the first kind deals with a device which produces
more energy than it uses.9 This clearly violates the first law of the ther-
modynamics, which states that energy is conserved. 0 In other words, energy
can neither be created nor destroyed, although it may be converted from one
form to another.1 Perpetual motion of the second kind relates to completely
converting heat into another form of energy. 2 Although this kind of perpetual
motion is consistent with the first law of thermodynamics, it violates the sec-
ond law, one version of which says that there is no process which can extract
heat from one source and convert it entirely into useful work.3 Perpetual mo-
tion of the third kind refers to motion which continues forever, as opposed to
the goal of generating useful energy seen in the first two kinds.14 Although this
kind of perpetual motion can actually occur (as in the phenomenon of super-
conductivity), 5 it produces no useful output.
Joseph Newman's machine seems to fall into the first category of
perpetual motion because he asserts that his device generates more energy
than it takes in from an external source. 16 Newman claims that his invention is
not a perpetual motion machine but rather a device which uses his newly-
discovered gyroscopic particles of matter. 7 Despite Newman's assertions, the
PTO and the courts treat his invention as a perpetual motion machine. 8
FACTS
Petitioner Newman applied for a patent on his "Energy Generation
System Having Higher Energy Output than Input."' 19 The PTO rejected the
710 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 41 (5th ed. 1982).
Id.
UId.
1J.R. WALDRAM, THE THEORY OF THERMODYNAMICS, at 57 (1985).
115 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 561 (5th ed. 1982).
110 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 7, at 41.
"WALDRAM, supra note 10, at 60.
14 10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, supra note 7, at 42.
15d.
"Peterson, A Patent Pursuit: Joe Newman's "Energy Machine, SCIENCE NEWS, June 1, 1985, at 342. This
article gives a good overview of Newman's machine and the battle Newman has waged with the Patent Of-
fice.
11d.
"Newman, 782 F.2d at 971.
"Id. at 972.
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application on the grounds that the device was a perpetual motion machine
and thus impossible."
Newman then filed a civil action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia under 35 U.S.C. Section 145.21 Due to conflicting
representations before it, the district court appointed William E. Schuyler, Jr.,
a former Commissioner of Patents, as Special Master to evaluate the
machine.2 Schuyler determined that although Newman's device seemed to
conflict with recognized principles of thermodynamics, overwhelming
evidence showed that the energy output from the device exceeded the external
energy input.23 Schuyler found no contradictory factual evidence and conclud-
ed that Newman's invention was patentable.
The PTO criticized Schuyler's findings, and the district court held some of
them to be clearly erroneous. 5 At the PTO's request, the district court remand-
ed Newman's patent application for a new examination." The patent examiner
then rejected Newman's invention under 35 U.S.C. Sections 101, 102, 103,
and 112.27
Meanwhile, Newman sought relief by writ of mandamus from the district
court's remand.28 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied the writ
because interlocutory review was unnecessary since the asserted errors could
20Id.
2135 U.S.C. § 145 (1982) states in relevant part:
An applicant dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Appeals may unless appeal has been taken to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, have remedy by civil action against the Commis-
sioner in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if commenced within such time after
such decision, not less than sixty days, as the Commissioner appoints.
"Newman, 782 F.2d at 972.
"Smith, An Endless Siege of Implausible Inventions, SCIENCE, Nov. 16, 1984, at 817. A number of scientists
have endorsed Newman's machine. One scientist who may have swayed Schuyler was Lawrence E. Whar-
ton, a physicist at NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center. Wharton had initially volunteered his services to
the PTO in this case but became convinced that the efficiency of Newman's device was substantially greater
than 100 percent.
241d.
"Newman, 782 F.2d at 972.
26 d.
"For 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982), see note 3. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1982) states a number of conditions required for
patentability. These conditions relate to the concept of novelty, which requires an invention to be new. 35
U.S.C. § 103 (1982) provides in relevant part that "the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole" must not have been obvious to a per-
son of ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made for a patent to issue. 35 U.S.C. § 112 deals
with the procedural requirement of the patent specification and states in relevant part:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and pro-
cess of making it and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skill-
ed in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same,
and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
The specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly
claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.
nNewman, 782 F.2d at 972.
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be corrected on appeal from the district court's final decision. 29
Shortly thereafter, the Commissioner served a request ° requiring
Newman to deliver working models of his invention to the National Bureau of
Standards (NBS) for a seven-month testing period.3 The request also included
among other things, that Newman and his counsel could observe the tests but
no expert could be present on his behalf, and that the NBS could dismantle or
destroy the machine after giving reasonable notice to Newman.32
Newman objected to the PTO's request, and the district court subsequent-
ly modified the request." The modifications included giving the NBS thirty
days instead of seven months and allowing one person in addition to Newman
and his counsel to observe any final tests. The district court orders also ex-
pressly permitted the NBS to render the device inoperable in whole or in part if
such action was necessary for its determination, and the orders did not require
that any prior notice be given to Newman regarding the dismantling or
destruction of his machine.33 From this ruling, Newman again petitioned the
appeals court for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to vacate or
modify its orders.3 6
THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
In response to Newman's petition for the writ, the court looked to
whether mandamus was appropriate in this situation.37 The court noted that
the petitioner alleged irreparable harm could occur if the court did not in-
tervene. 8 The court concluded that a prima facie case had been made by the
district court's authorization of the destruction of petitioner's machine." The
"In re Newman, 763 F.2d 407 (Fed. Cir. 1985). *However, the actual wording in the text of this note comes
from Newman 782 F.2d at 972.
"Newman, 782 F.2d at 972-73. The PTO made the request pursuant to Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 34 states in relevant part:
Any person may serve on another party a request... to inspect and copy, test, or sample any tangi-
ble things which constitute or contain matters within the scope of Rule 26(b) and which are in posses-
sion, custody or control of the party upon whom the request is served....
"Id. at 973.
'Id. The request to dismantle or destroy the machine does not appear to address the issue of whether the
machine operates, but rather why the machine operates. This distinction plays an important role later on in
the court's analysis.
3Id.
3'Id.
"Id. The absence of a prior notice requirement in the court's orders does not comport with Rule 34
guidelines, which require "a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performing
the related acts."
"Id. at 972.
"'Id. at 973. The court noted that it had jurisdiction to hear and decide the petition for mandamus. In re
Mark Industries, 751 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Mississippi Chemical Corp. v. Swift Agricultural
Chemicals Corp., 717 F.2d 1374 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
381d.
391d.
[Vol. 2 1:1
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court held that mandamus was appropriate because "no subsequent appeal will
necessarily redress any damage."4 0
In reaching this decision, the court reviewed its position on cases involv-
ing inventions which were questionable in regard to operativeness.,' The court
noted it had held that the PTO could reject any application for insufficient
proof when the device "by its nature occasions reasonable skepticism as to its
operativeness under Section 101."42 Since Newman's invention involved ques-
tionable operativeness, the court found no abuse of discretion on the part of
the district court in its holding that additional tests of petitioner's device should
be conducted. 3
Despite its approval of the additional testing, the appeals court rejected
the district court's position that the unprecedented device required un-
precedented "procedural adaptations of the Federal Rules."" The appeals
court stated that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "ensure that the pro-
ceedings are conducted fairly, with the objective of uncovering the truth, and
in accordance with fundamental principles of due process. '45 The court noted
that the district court gave no reasons why Rule 34 safeguards had to be
denied in this case, nor why it was necessary for the NBS to have the authority
to destroy the machine in determining if it operates as described.4 The appeals
court observed that the record did not indicate that petitioner's invention did
not correspond with the specification in the patent application.47 Rather, the
court remarked, the only asserted basis for rejection was lack of utility under
§101.48 Destroying Newman's invention would not prove a lack of utility;
determining utility in this case is the domain of testing alone.49
4Id. The court noted Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964), in which a district court judge granted an
order for mental and physical examinations of the petitioner under Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The Supreme Court held that under the circumstances of the case, mandamus was an ap-
propriate remedy to review the challenged power to order the examinations. Similarly, Newman's case in-
volves unusual circumstances (testing a perpetual motion machine) and a question regarding the lower
court's power to issue certain orders (dismantling or destroying the machine).
'Id. Specifically, the court looked at Fregeau v. Mossinghoff, 776 F.2d 1034 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (using a
magnetic field to enhance the flavor of beverages) and In re Langer, 503 F.2d 1380 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (an im-
provement in dentifrices).
2Id. (citing Fregeau).
"Id. at 973-974. The district court's order for additional testing was indeed reasonable because the invention
appears to conflict with established scientific laws.
"Id. at 974. The unprecedented "procedural adaptations" are the potential dismantling and destruction of
the machine.
5Id.
46d. The Rule 34 safeguards include a reasonable manner of testing. The appeals court rightfully maintains
that destroying the machine is unreasonable for purposes of testing the operativeness of the machine.
47Id.
,3Id.
41The main utility of Newman's machine is in its alleged ability to create a net outflow of energy. Destroying
the machine has no relevance to determining whether the machine produces more energy than it uses. Only
test measurements can serve to resolve the question of utility.
Summer, 19871 NOTES
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The court continued by analyzing the PTO's representation in its brief
that the NBS would not dismantle or destroy petitioner's invention until after
it had determined that the device worked according to the specification. 0
Based on this statement, the court reasoned that the purpose of destroying the
machine would be to see how it works.5 In regard to this purpose, the court
stated that "the PTO is not a guarantor of scientific theory and, although the
record shows that the laws of thermodynamics were debated before the district
court, it is not the province of the PTO to ascertain scientific explanation."52
Based on this analysis, the appeals court concluded that petitioner's invention
should not be dismantled or destroyed without his consent.53
The court went on to discuss the testing process.' In particular, the court
focused on the concept that "the objectivity of the tester is a fundamental rule
not only of evidence but of conscience."" The court noted that although the
NBS entered the case as an impartial laboratory of scientific renown, some of
its employees criticized petitioner's invention before the NBS had tested it.56
This obvious prejudice further supports the conclusion that procedural
safeguards should not be denied in perpetual motion cases.
ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION
Applicants for patents on perpetual motion machines face a long uphill
battle with the PTO. The Manual of Patent Examining Procedure provides
grounds for rejecting perpetual motion machines on a basis of
inoperativeness." This rationale for rejection is evident in perpetual motion
cases. In Ex parte Payne,"8 the court held that where a claim is made to a
perpetual motion machine, the examiner may reject the claim for in-
operativeness without making a search through or citing prior art.59 In Ex
'
0Newman, 782 F.2d at 974.
51 d.
'
2Id. The court noted in In re Anfhauser, 399 F.2d 275 (C.C.P.A. 1968), in which the patent applicant
developed a process for coating paper but did not comprehend the underlying scientific principles, that an in-
ventor is not legally required to understand the principles upon which the practical effectiveness of his in-
vention rests.
531d
5 Id. Here the court noted Wagoner v. Barger, 463 F.2d 1377 (C.C.P.A. 1972) and Congoleum Industries,
Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 319 F. Supp. 714 (E.D. Pa. 1970) affd, 510 F.2d 334 (3d Cir. 1975) cert. denied
421 U.S. 988 (1975) for a general principle of testing. The Wagoner decision stated that the results of tests
made by one party without notice to and in the absence of the other party are given little weight. The Con-
goleum Industries case also stated that experimental evidence from tests conducted by an interested party in
the absence of the opposing party is given negligible probative value.
551d.
'Id. An NBS spokesman criticized the machine in front of the press prior to testing, while the affidavit of
another NBS employee criticized the device even though the employee had neither seen nor tested it.
7MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 706.03(p) (1986) (supplement to E. LIPSCOMB, LIPSCOMBS
WALKER ON PATENTS, 3d ed. 1984).
'1904 Dec. Comm'r Pat. 42, 108 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 1049 (1903).
591d.
[Vol. 2 1:1
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parte Ackert,60 the court stated that a bizarre arrangement of parts which
allegedly gains power is fallacious and not patentable." The court noted that
the prestige of the Patent Office must be protected against frivolous claims.62
In re Perrigo63 is a perpetual motion case involving a "Method and Apparatus
for Accumulating and Transforming Ether Electric Energy." 6 The court in
Perrigo stated that it is fundamental that an alleged invention be useful, and
that it must seem capable of doing what is claimed in order to be a practical in-
vention.6 1
There is good reason for the PTO and the courts to take a hardline ap-
proach in dealing with perpetual motion because the likelihood of fraud in
these cases is high.66 In Estep v. United States, 67 the court found a scheme to
defraud investors through the sale of stock in the Automotor Manufacturing
Company, Inc., which was supposedly about to market a fuelless, self-
energizing motor .6 The Ackert court recognized the value of a patent and the
confidence which the public has in a patent 9.6 To preserve this status, it is clear
that the PTO and the courts must be on guard to protect against fraud in
perpetual motion cases.
Despite the need for extra care in dealing with patent applications involv-
ing perpetual motion machines, there is no valid reason for dismantling or
destroying the applicant's invention as long as the PTO and the court are
satisfied that the invention does not contain any concealed power sources. The
Newman case is an excellent opportunity to analyze this proposition. As noted
previously, the PTO stated that the NBS would not dismantle or destroy peti-
tioner's device until it first determined that the device worked according to the
specification. 7 0 This means that the NBS would have already satisfied itself
that no "hidden cranks" or secret energy sources were actually powering the
machine. To dismantle or destroy the machine regardless indicates that the
PTO and the NBS want to discover why the machine works." As the Newman
court so ably pointed out, determining the scientific theory on which an inven-
tion operates is not within the PTO's domain.72 Rather, the mission of the PTO
61872 Dec. Comm'r. Pat. 47, 1 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office 253 (1872).
61Id.
Q1d.
6348 F.2d 965 (C.C.P.A. 1931).
4Id.
"Id. at 966.
"I E. LIPSCOMB, LIPSCOMBS WALKER ON PATENTS, 5:14 (3d ed. 1984).
17223 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 863 (1955).
"Id. at 20.
"Ackert, 1872 Dec. Comm'r Pat. at 47, 1 Off. Gaz. Pat. Office at 253.
'"Newman, 782 F.2d at 974.
7Id.
2Id.
Summer, 19871 NOTES
7
Kramer: The Federal Court Dismantles an Obstacle for Perpetual Motion Patent Applicants
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1988
AKRON LAW REVIEW
is to carry out the constitutional mandate of promoting the progress of science
and useful arts by securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive right to
their discoveries. 73
To accomplish the goal of promoting science and the useful arts, the PTO
examines inventions for utility. Utility in patent law means a useful invention
able to function as intended to produce results beneficial to the country. 7' An
invention lacks utility if it is wholly inoperative with respect to its claimed
functions." In Application of Chilowsky,76 the court said that where the
claimed operativeness "seems clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific
principle as, for example, where an applicant purports to have discovered a
machine producing perpetual motion, the presumption of inoperativeness is so
strong that very clear evidence is required to overcome it.""
Evidence of operativeness can come from testing. In Field v. Knowles,78
the court said that unless a machine is so simple that "its practical
operativeness is manifest," it must be tested under actual working conditions in
such a way as to show its intended purpose.79 Federal Civil Rule 34 has become
the key discovery device for resolving complex scientific questions. 0 Rule 34
applies in large part to the production of documents," but it also includes tests
to determine the operativeness of inventions. As the Newman court noted,
such tests are conducted in the presence of the opposing party, and the test
data are provided to all parties. 2 The results of the tests play a major role in
determining whether the PTO will reject the application.
CONCLUSION
Joseph Newman's patent quest continued after the decision by the Court
of Appeals. The NBS finally tested Newman's machine and determined that
the device's efficiency ranged from twenty-seven to sixty-seven percent de-
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
11 LLPSCOMB, supra note 66, § 5:2, at 482.
"Coupe v. Royer, 155 U.S. 565 (1895); Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. 287 (1874); Houston v. Brown Mfg.
Co., 270 F. 445 (6th Cir. 1921).
76229 F.2d 457 (C.C.P.A. 1956).
"Id. at 462.
"183 F.2d 593 (C.C.P.A. 1950).
"Id at 601. See also Ajem Laboratories, Inc. v. C.M. Ladd Co., 424 F.2d 1124 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 830 (1970) (adopting the standard for satisfactory reduction to practice outlined in Field, Toledo
Scale Corp. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 351 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1965) (satisfactory reduction to practice
does not require proof of successful commercial use, but it does demand tests which successfully prove prac-
tical utility for intended use); Skil Corp. v. Lucerne Products, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Ohio 1980),
affd, 684 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 991 (1982) (invention is reduced to practice by
building a working model and operating it under simulated field conditions, with tests successfully proving
practical utility for the intended use.)
"Underwood, Discovery According to Federal Rule 34, 26 PRAC. LAW., No. 2, at 55 (Mar. 1, 1980).
"Id. at 57. The term "documents" is very broad, encompassing writings, drawings, graphs, charts, and
photographs, among other things.
"Newman, 782 F.2d at 974.
[Vol. 2 1:1
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pending on the test conditions." The results were far below the 100 percent ef-
ficiency level at which perpetual motion begins. However, Newman and his
backers contend that the NBS improperly tested the device, so Newman is tak-
ing his case to Congress.14
If a true perpetual motion machine is actually ever built, it would rank as
one of the greatest inventions of all time." Because of the Newman decision,
the PTO will not be able to dismantle or destroy the device just to determine
why it works. 6 As the Court of Appeals correctly stated, it is not the province
of the PTO to determine scientific theory." Otherwise, the successful perpetual
motion machine inventor might not receive a patent solely because the PTO
cannot understand why the device works. Skeptics can argue that the PTO
should not waste its time on a device which, according to conventional science,
cannot possibly work. But just think what an injustice that attitude would be
causing if perpetual motion really is possible. After all, science has been wrong
before...
BRUCE KRAMER
3Sun, Newman's 'Energy Output'Machine Put to the Test, SCIENCE, July 11, 1986, at 154 (using informa-
tion from "Report of Tests on Joseph Newman's Device," U.S. Department of Commerce, National Bureau
of Standards, NBSIR 866-3405, June 1986).
"Legislation: Would-be Patentee Pleads Case Before Senate Panel, 32 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J.
(BNA) No. 792, at 378 (Aug. 14, 1986).
uSun, Newman's Motor: Does It Work or Doesn't It?. SCIENCE, Mar. 29, 1985, at 1558.
uNewman, 782 F.2d at 972.
rId. at 974.
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